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INTRODUCTION

Three federal circuit courts of appeals recently have held that
United States citizens are not entitled to a jury trial in an action
against a commercial corporation owned by a foreign government.
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals" agree
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),2 the sole basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction, provides only for nonjury
trials in legal actions against commercial corporations owned by a
foreign government. These courts also agree that this statutory
denial of a jury trial does not abridge a citizen's seventh amend1. Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981); Williams
v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania

Peruana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).

864

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.863

ment right.' These decisions are important because of the "widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities."'4 This Recent Development
examines the legal backgrounds of sovereign immunity and the
right to a jury trial, the recent decisions, and the analysis adopted
by each of the circuit courts.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Sovereign Immunity

The modern doctrine5 of immunity for foreign sovereigns, their
agents, and instrumentalities was first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in- The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.6 The Exchange, allegedly taken by force from United States citizens, entered the port of Philadelphia as a French man-of-war to take on
supplies and to effect repairs.7 The former owners filed a libel in
rem seeking the vessel's return. The Court held that a public
armed vessel in the service of a foreign sovereign with whom the
United States is at peace enters United States ports "under an
implied promise" that she will be free from judicial process.8
Chief Justice Marshall explained that this immunity, although
absolute, is grounded in concepts of comity. This must be so, explained the Court, because immunity is an exception to the "full
and complete power of a nation within its own territory" and thus
"must be traced up to the consent of the [host] nation." 9 Furthermore, dictum in the decision established 0 a distinction between

3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. The seventh amendment preserves the right to
trial by jury in actions at law, not in actions in equity or admiralty. Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
4. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of
State, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted
in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952).
5. Triggs, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: The State as International
Trader, 53 AUSTL. L.J. 244, 245 (1979). Grotius maintained that ambassadors
and their property should be immune from judicial process and executive action.
H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIs 216 (Whewell trans. 1853).
6. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
7. Id. at 117.
8. Id. at 146.
9. Id. at 135.
10. Grotius recognized that some acts "are not done by the king as king, but
by him as by any other person." H. GROTIUS, supra note 5, at 178.
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the public and the private acts of a foreign sovereign.11 The
United States attorney, arguing for immunity, said, "if a sovereign descends from the throne and becomes a merchant, he sub'1 2
mits to the laws of the country."
The Court later applied this distinction between a sovereign's
public acts and its commercial acts in Bank of United States v.
Planter's Bank of Georgia.13 "It is, -we think, a sound principle,
that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private
citizen." 14
English courts addressed the question of immunity for foreign,
government-owned vessels in The Parlement Belge15 and The
Porto Alexandre."8 In The ParlementBelge the Court of Appeal
held that an action in rem could not lie against a vessel owned by
the Kingdom of Belgium which was used primarily for public activity and subordinately for commercial activity. 17 The Porto
Alexandre presented a different situation. Portugal owned The
Alexandre and used it exclusively for commercial activity. 8
Plaintiff, citing the language from Planter'sBank quoted above,
argued that the nature of the activity was the controlling consideration19 and that the vessel lost any possible immunity because
of the commercial nature of its activities.20 The Court of Appeal
rejected this argument and held that a vessel owned by a foreign
sovereign is immune
from judicial process regardless of the nature
21
of its activity.

The United States Supreme Court in 1926 handed down Bell. The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
12. Id. at 123. Explaining the limits of the Court's decision, Chief Justice
Marshall said, "[I]t may safely be affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction
between private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and the
military force which supports the sovereign power ... " Id. at 144.
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
14. Id. at 907.
15.

5 P.D. 197 (1880).

16. 1920 P. 30.
17. 5 P.D. at 214-15. The court based its decision upon the equality of all
sovereigns and the comity thus due. Id. at 207-08.
18. 1920 P. 30, 34.
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 34, 35, 38.
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rizzi Brothers Co. v. The Pesaro,22 in which the Court adopted a
doctrine similar to the English doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The Italian government owned and operated The Pesaro solely
for commercial activity. 23 The Department of State refused to

recommend immunity because of the commercial nature of the
activity. 24 The Court, however, granted immunity and held that

merchant vessels owned and controlled by foreign sovereigns for
the purpose of "advancing the trade of its people or providing
revenue for its treasury" are public vessels in the same sense as
men-of-war. 25 The Court noted that, although only private citizens operated merchant vessels in 1812 and "there was little
thought of governments engaging in such operations, ' 26 it nevertheless considered the principles of The Schooner Exchange2 7 to
be controlling. 28 The Court thus held, as the English Court of Ap-

peal had held in The Porto Alexandre, that a foreign, governfrom judicial process regardless of
ment-owned vessel is immune
29
the nature of its activity.

While the United States and Great Britain were adopting this
position, other nations were negotiating the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels (hereinafter referred to as the
Convention).3 Twenty-one nations signed the Convention on
April 10, 1926.31 The United States was not a signatory. The Con22.

271 U.S. 562 (1926).

23.

Id. at 570. The plaintiff filed a libel in rem against the vessel in an at-

tempt to recover damages allegedly caused by the failure to deliver artificial silk
to New York. Id. at 569. After the vessel was seized, the Italian Ambassador
appeared and argued that the vessel was immune from judicial process because
the vessel was owned and possessed by Italy. Id. at 570.
24. The Pesaro,277 F. 473, 479-80 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Defendants, wishing to raise the defense of sovereign immunity, petitioned the Department of
State for an immunity ruling. The Department of State sent a letter explaining
its position to the district court. See Recent Development, Sovereign Immunity,
13 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. 835, 837 (1980).

25. Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 574.
26.
27.

Id. at 573.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

28. Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 573.
29. Id. at 576.
30. Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199.
31. Id. at 211-15. The signatory nations were Germany; Chile; Belgium; Denmark; Brazil; Spain; France; Estonia; Hungary; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Mexico;
Norway; the Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Great Britain; Rumania; Sweden;

and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
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vention provided that, for purposes of immunity, state-owned
commercial vessels would be treated in the same manner as privately-owned vessels.2
Eighteen years after the Convention, the United States Supreme Court, in Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar,3 took a step backward from its decision in
The Pesaro. The Navemar involved a ship allegedly seized by its
crew. A libel in rem was brought in a federal district court by
petitioner Compania Espanola, a private Spanish corporation
which claimed ownership of the vessel. The government of Spain
also claimed ownership and its Ambassador sought to raise the
protection of sovereign immunity."' The Department of State refused to recommend immunity for the vessel. Because the evidence at hand did not suggest that The Navemar had been in the
possession of the Spanish government, the Court held that the
government of Spain was not entitled to sovereign immunity, but
must intervene on remand for the purpose of establishing owner37
36
ship.3 5 Although the facts of Mexico v. Hoffman were similar

to those of The Navemar, the Court's focus was quite different.
In Mexico v. Hoffman the Court focused directly upon the refusal
of the Department of State to recommend immunity for a vessel
that was owned by the government of Mexico but operated by a
private corporation under contract.38 The Court denied immunity
to the defendants; it did not, however, deny immunity to every
vessel engaged in commercial activity, 9 although Justice Frankfurter encouraged this approach in his concurrence.'0
32. Id. at 207.
33. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
34. Id. at 75. The Spanish Ambassador filed a suggestion arguing that the
vessel was immune from judicial process because it was owned by Spain, but the
Department of State did not recommend immunity. Id. at 75-76. In dictum, the
Court said that if the Executive Branch recommended immunity, it was "the

duty of the courts to release the vessel." Id. at 74.
35. Id. at 76.
36. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
37. Respondent filed a libel in rem seeking to recover damages caused when

the Mexican vessel collided with respondent's fishing boat. Id. at 31. The Mexican Ambassador filed a suggestion alleging that the vessel was immune because
it was owned by Mexico. Id.
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id. at 40-41 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter asserted
that possession was an improper test for immunity. Id. at 40. He considered the
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Although most writers on sovereign immunity focus on the development of the law surrounding vessels, it is also important to
consider the treatment of corporations owned by foreign governments. 41 The development of immunity in maritime law is distinct from the development of immunity in the corporate context.
Chief Justice Marshall's recognition of the distinction between
the public governmental acts of a sovereign and its private commercial acts42 in The Schooner Exchange provides the basis for
the development of a doctrine of immunity for foreign, government-owned corporations. The difference in approach is particularly significant for this Recent Development because actions

against government-owned vessels arise in admiralty wherein no
right to a jury trial exists.4 3
Planter'sBank44 established the proposition that corporations
owned by the United States and engaged in commercial activity
are not immune from suit. Molina v. Comision Reguladora del
Mercado de Henequen45 was the first United States case to confront the question of immunity for corporations owned by foreign
sovereigns. Mexico created Comision, a commercial corporation,
to trade in sisal. Molina sued Comision for conversion. Pursuant
to traditional practice, the Department of State declined to recommend immunity because of the commercial nature of Comision's activity. 4" Comision argued for immunity because Mexico, a
foreign sovereign, owned its stock.47 The New Jersey Supreme
Court found this proposition to be a "startling one"; furthermore,
the court found "no authority . . . for the proposition that foreign corporations which happen to be governmental agencies are
immune from judicial process."4 8 A federal district court reached
the same result in Coale v. Societe Co-operativeSuisse des Char-

"enormous growth" of governmental participation in commercial activities probative and urged adoption of a test rejecting immunity when a sovereign engaged in commercial activity. Id. at 39-41.
41. "The fundamental characteristic of a corporation is that it ... has an
existence separate from its shareholders." R. DEET, THE LAWYER'S BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE MANUAL 7 (2d ed. 1978).

42. See supra text accompanying notes 13 & 15.
43. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
44. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824); see supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
45.
46.

91 N.J.L. 382, 103 A. 397 (1918).
Id. at 384-85, 103 A. at 398.

47. Id. at 386, 103 A. at 399.
48. Id. at 386-87, 103 A. at 399.
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bons, 4 9 which involved a Swiss government-owned corporation established to trade in coal. The Coale court rejected defendant's
request for immunity stating that if Switzerland chose to do business by means of a corporation, then the corporation was liable
for its obligations. The court found "no case which holds otherwise."' 50 The same court recognized the distinct identity of a foreign, government-owned corporation in United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft.51 France owned elevenfifteenths of a corporation organized to trade in potash. The
United States sued the corporation for violations of the antitrust
laws and the Department of State declined to recommend immunity because of the commercial nature of the activity.52 The
French ambassador appeared and requested immunity for the
corporation, citing The Schooner Exchange, The Pesaro,and The
ParlementBeige. The court rejected the ambassador's arguments,
observing that the law under which the corporation was formed
provided that the corporation could sue and be sued.53 This, the
court said, deprived the corporation of any immunity. "A suit
against a corporation is not a suit against a government merely
because it has been incorporated by direction of the government,
and is used as a governmental agent, and its stock is owned solely
by the government. ' '54 The court noted that sovereign immunity
is a matter of comity and is based upon the consent of the host
nation. 5 Deutsches is particularly significant because it rejected
the defendant's citation of The Pesaro,ruling that case inapplicable in the corporate context. At a time when commercial government-owned vessels were afforded broad immunity, the court refused to grant immunity to a corporation owned and controlled
by a foreign sovereign.
Soon after Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Mexico v. Hoffman,8 the Department of State issued the Tate Letter," which
49. 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
50. Id. at 181.
51. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).

52. Id. at 200.
53. Id. at 202.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 203.
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
57. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Department of
State, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted
in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952).
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reviewed the law of other countries and expressly adopted the position that immunity was unavailable to a foreign government
when it engaged in commercial conduct.58 The Tate Letter clari-

fied purportedly long-standing policy 9 and remained the leading
expression of United States jurisprudence on sovereign immunity
until Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA or Act) s0 in 1976. One of the primary objectives of the
FSIA is to ensure that questions of sovereign immunity are left
exclusively to the courts, thus avoiding the political and diplomatic pressures exerted upon the Department of State. 1 The
FSIA codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, which
divests a foreign sovereign of immunity when engaged in commercial activities.0 2 The FSIA applies to all "foreign states," which is
defined to include corporations owned by a foreign sovereign."
B. The Seventh Amendment
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "

In Pernell v. Southall Realty,

5

the Supreme

Court explained that the right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the action rather than upon the state of English law as
incorporated by the seventh amendment in 1791.
Whether or not a close equivalent to [the statute giving rise to the
action] existed in England in 1791 is irrelevant for Seventh
58. Id. at 984-85.

59. Several Department of State recommendations are explicable only on political grounds. See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Isbrandten
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961);

Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864
(1966); see also Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in
Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution, 27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 751-52
(1929).
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 7, 12 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6606, 6610 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1487].
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
63. Id. § 1603(b)(2).
64. U.S. CONST.amend. VII.
65. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
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Amendment purposes, for that Amendment requires trial by jury

in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an
action at law, rather than in an action at equity or admiralty.68

Decisions following Pernell consistently recognize that the right
to a jury trial does not depend "on the procedural situation at a
given moment in the past, the time when the Seventh Amend-

ment was adopted," but rather on the nature of the relief
7
sought.6
Actions unheard of at common law may require jury
trials."

66. Id. at 375.

67. Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 667 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1979); e.g.,
Hildebrand v. Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1979) The
court stated: "[T]he chief focus to be made when determining whether a jury
trial right exists is the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 708.
68. The Second Circuit recognizes the right to a jury trial when an allegedly
wrongfully expelled union member seeks damages in an action against his union.
Feltington v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators, 605 F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (2d Cir.
1979). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court stated:
Although the thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the
right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the
right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that
time. Mr. Justice Story established the basic principle in 1830:
"The phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence...
By common law, the [Framers of the Amendment] meant ...

not

merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained

and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable

rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered . . .In a just sense, the amendment then may well be con-

strued to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty
jurisdiction, whatever might be the peculiar form which they may
assume to settle legal rights." Parsonsv. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446-47
(1830) (emphasis in original)."
Id. at 193. The Court in Curtis went on to say that the amendment's applicability to statutory actions is "too obvious to be doubted." Id. The Court cited as
authority: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws);
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (immigration laws); Fleitmann
v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (antitrust laws). Curtis, 415
U.S. at 193.
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III. THE CASES
A.

The Second Circuit -

Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de
Vapores

In Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana de Vapores6 9 three longshoremen seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused
by defendants' negligence sued three shipping companies owned
by foreign sovereigns.7 0 Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and defendants moved to strike the demand as inconsistent with the
FSIA.7 1 The district court granted defendants' motion but certified the question for interlocutory review.7 2 The Second Circuit
first considered defendants' argument that federal jurisdiction in
suits against foreign, state-owned corporations must be based
upon the FSIA, which precludes trial by jury.7 3 The court reviewed the FSIA and its legislative history.7 4 Section 1603 of the
FSIA provides that a corporation owned by a foreign state is a
foreign state for the purposes of the Act.7 5 The FSIA amended
the general federal removal statute 8 to expressly provide that a
removed action against a foreign state "shall be tried by the court
without a jury. '77 The court observed that the legislative history
is also clear: "Actions tried by a court without a jury will tend to
promote a uniformity in decision where foreign governments are
involved. '7 81 The court concluded that the FSIA clearly does not
69. 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981).
70. The defendant shipping companies were owned by Peru, Poland, and Indonesia, respectively. Id. at 873.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 873-75.

75. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). That section provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this chapter (a) A foreign state ...

includes ...

instrumentality of a foreign state as

defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means an entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state ....

Id.
76.

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).

77. Id. § 1441(d) (1976).
78. Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 877 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 61 at
13, reprinted at 6611-12).
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provide for trial by jury.79 Plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction could
be based upon diversity of citizenship statutes s° as well as the
FSIA when the defendant is a foreign corporation rather than a
foreign government."1 The court rejected this argument, saying
that the same entity could not be a foreign state and a citizen of a
foreign state.8 2 The court concluded that actions against foreign,
state-owned corporations must be brought under the FSIA and
no right to a jury trial exists under that statute. The court then
turned to the seventh amendment issue. The court stated that
the seventh amendment merely preserves the right to a jury trial
as it existed at common law.8 3 The court said there was no right
of action against a foreign state at common law.8 Clearly, therefore, there could be no right in 1791 against "a foreign government or instrumentality thereof."83 The United States established

the right to sue foreign countries in United States courts, said the
court, and this right may be conditioned upon the denial of a jury
trial just as a citizen's right to sue the United States may be conditioned upon the absence of a jury trial. 6 The court rejected as
insignificant the distinction between suits against a domestic sovereign and suits against a foreign sovereign. 7 Thus, concluded the
court, no constitutional right to trial by jury exists in actions
against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities. 8 Plaintiffs
argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Pernell v. Southal
Realty"9 and Curtis v. Loether90 required a contrary result. 1 The
court distinguished those cases, noting that, when a domestic substantive law right is enlarged, the seventh amendment requires a
jury trial only if the new substantive right is analogous to one at
common law.92 These decisions, opined the court, do not deal

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 878.
at 875.

at 879.

at 879-80.

88. Id. at 881.
89. 416 U.S. 363 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
90. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
91.

Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 881.

92. Id.
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with a defendant such as a foreign sovereign who was not amenable to suit at common law.
B. The Fourth Circuit-Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India
3 a longshoreman filed
In Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India"
suit in a Virginia state court against a corporation owned by the
government of India, seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. Defendant removed the
action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441(d)."
The trial court rejected the plaintiff's demand for a jury trial and
plaintiff appealed.9 5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' treatment of the statutory issue was simple: section 1441(d) expressly
provides that upon removal, actions against foreign states and
their instrumentalities shall be tried by the court without a jury.9 6
The court, after an extensive review of the FSIA, concluded that
the FSIA was the sole basis for federal jurisdiction over this action and that no jury trial was available in actions under the
FSIA. 97 The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the seventh amendment
was virtually identical to that of the Second Circuit, with one additional statement. The court concluded that because foreign sovereigns were not amenable to suit at common law, no right to a
jury trial exists under the seventh amendment in actions against
a corporation owned by a foreign sovereign.98 The court expressly
stated that, for a jury trial right to exist, "it is not enough that
the nature of the plaintiff's action is 'legal', rather than maritime
or equitable; the action must also be brought against a defendant
who was sueable at common law in 1791."'9 The court cited no
authority for this proposition and failed to distinguish actions
against a foreign sovereign from actions against a corporation

93. Williams, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 877. Title 28, section 1441 of the United States Code provides:
Any civil action brought in a State Court against a foreign state as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending. Upon removal the action shall be
tried by the court without jury ....
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1976).

95. Williams, 653 F.2d at 877.
96. Id. at 881; see supra note 94.
97. Williams, 653 F.2d at 881.
98. Id. at 883.

99. Id.
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owned by a foreign sovereign.
C.

The Third Circuit-Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A.

In Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 10 0 plaintiff longshoreman sued a shipping company owned by the government of Peru
for damages allegedly caused by defendant's negligence.1 0 1 Plaintiff brought the action under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 102 asserting jurisdiction on the bases
of federal question, diversity of citizenship, and the FSIA. 0 3 The
district court granted plaintiff's demand for a jury trial, refusing
to regard the FSIA as the sole basis of federal jurisdiction in cases
in which the defendant is a foreign corporation rather than a foreign government.10 4 The court of appeals quickly disposed of the
lower court's opinion. The Third Circuit noted the legislative his-

tory of the FSIA10 5 and refused to recognize diversity of citizenship or federal question as appropriate bases for jurisdiction. 10 6
The court concluded that no statutory right to a jury trial exists
1 07
in an action against a corporation owned by a foreign sovereign.
Treating the constitutional question with greater circumspection, the court reminded itself that "it must be cautious to respect the presumption of constitutionality that is afforded acts of
a coordinate branch of government."108 The seventh amendment
issue, the court said, must be considered in the context of congressional foreign policy objectives. 10 9 Reviewing Curtis v.
Loether ° and Pernell v. Southall Realty,"" the court said that it
did not "view-the common law as frozen in 1791. ' 12 Plaintiff ar-

100. Rex, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
Foreign

Id. at 62.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
Rex, 660 F.2d at 62.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. The court failed to note that one of the principal objectives of the
Sovereign Immunities Act was to avoid foreign policy issues in these

cases by ensuring that decisions are made on purely legal grounds. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
110. 415 U.S. 189 (1973); see supra note 68.
111. 416 U.S. 363 (1974); see supra note 89.

112. Rex, 660 F.2d at 66.
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gued that because he sought a legal remedy, damages, he was entitled by the seventh amendment to a jury trial.113 The court rejected this argument, citing a long line of cases114 which hold that
the United States need not subject itself to a jury trial when it
consents to be sued.1 15 The court then reviewed the history of
sovereign immunity and concluded that the right of action
against a foreign sovereign has always existed at the sufferance of
the Department of State.11 The majority opinion considered the
effect of the FSIA on this history and again emphasized the importance of congressional foreign policy objectives.117 The court of
appeals concluded that "a suit against a foreign sovereign in district court pursuant to the FSIA is not a suit at common law
within the meaning of the seventh amendment, and therefore...
the denial of jury trial in the Act does not violate the Constitution."111 "[Valid and legitimate [congressional] foreign policy
concern[s]" constituted the crux of the majority's reasoning. 1 9
Judge Sloviter raised three points in dissent. First, he criticized
the majority's treatment of the seventh amendment. He consid-

ered improper the majority's emphasis on the defendant's amenability to suit at common law.120 The dissent stated that the nature
of the remedy plaintiff sought determined the existence of any
right to a jury trial. 121 Second, Judge Sloviter objected to the
analogy between suits against the United States and suits against
foreign sovereigns. 122 The immunity of the United States depends
upon "a variety of constitutional, historical and metaphysical
principles," whereas the immunity of foreign sovereigns "stems
from notions of comity and expediency in the conduct of foreign
affairs. 1 22 3 Third, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to
113. Id. at 66-67.

114. Id. at 67. The court cited, inter alia, Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372 (1943), and Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
115. E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
116. Rex, 660 F.2d at 68.
117. Id. at 68-69. The court did not explain what foreign policy objectives it
or Congress considered.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 70-71.
123. Id. at 71.
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recognize "a distinction historically observed between the foreign
sovereign itself and its ownership interests.

'124

The dissent re-

viewed Coale v. SociWt Cooperative Suisse des Charbons 25 and
United States v. Deutsche Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,2 6 and
cited a series of other opinions recognizing the distinction between a corporation owned by a foreign sovereign and the sovereign itself. 27 The dissent further relied upon a line of cases, beginning with Planter'sBank, holding that a corporation owned by
the United States is distinct from the United States and is not
entitled to immunity.' 28 Finally, Judge Sloviter criticized the majority for allowing an alleged foreign policy objective to override a
fundamental constitutional right. 2 9 He concluded that a tort action against a corporation owned by a foreign sovereign is a legal
action analogous to one at common law within the meaning of the
seventh amendment, thus entitling the plaintiff to trial by jury. 30
IV. ANALYSIS
Each of these decisions treated the statutory issues properly.
Although Congress could have been more artful in its legislative
drafting, it clearly intended that the FSIA be the sole basis for
federal jurisdiction in actions against foreign sovereigns and their
instrumentalities and that jury trials not be available.' 3 ' The constitutional question is a different matter. Judge Sloviter, in his
dissent, correctly identified the courts' errors.3 2 First, the Second
and Fourth Circuits' static approach to the seventh amendment is
improper because of the Supreme Court's decision in Pernell v.

124.
125.

Id. at 72-74.
21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.

126. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See supra-text accompanying notes 44-55.
127. Rex, 660 F.2d at 72.
128. Id. at 73.
129. Id. at 75.
130. Id. at 76.
131. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text. Some district courts
have improperly tortured the statutory language in an attempt to avoid the constitutional question. E.g., Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D.
Md. 1980), rev'd and remanded,667 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1982); Lonon v. Compania de Navegaco, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v. Olympic Airways, 82
F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
132. Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 70 (3d Cir. 1981); see
supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
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Southall Realty.133 The Third Circuit claimed that it rejected a
static interpretation, but the court's analytical approach contradicts its statement. The Second and Fourth Circuits refer to a
requirement that the defendant be sueable at common law. This
position is faulty in two respects. First, no authority exists for
this proposition. Second, this proposition assumes there is no distinction between a foreign sovereign and its corporations. The
seventh amendment may require trial by jury in actions unheard
of at common law.13 4 Therefore, even if the distinction is unimportant here, the static approach used by all three courts is
erroneous.
An analogy between suits against the United States and suits
against instrumentalities of foreign states is inappropriate. The
conceptual bases for the two types of immunity are completely
different. The United States immunity from suits by its citizens is
grounded on the notion that there can be no right of action
against the entity upon whom the right depends. 13 5 The foreign
sovereign's immunity, however, is based upon the consent of the
host nation.13 ' The immunity is presumed not to exist in the absence of the host nation's consent. The instant decisions reverse
this proposition by maintaining that immunity is presumed to exist absent the host nation's declaration to the contrary. Even if
the foreign sovereign's amenability to suit exists "at the sufferance of the United States Department of State,"'' 37 Congress recognized the political problems in maintaining that position and
enacted the FSIA. Because the conceptual bases for the two types
of immunity are distinct, any analogy between them is
inappropriate.
A clear line of authority recognizes the distinction between a
foreign sovereign and its corporations. 3' The Second Circuit recently recognized this distinction in a different legal context. In
Banco Para el Comercio v. FirstNational City Bank"3 9 the court
refused to hold that "a trading corporation wholly owned by a
foreign government, but created and operated as a separate jurid133.
134.
135.
136.

416 U.S. 363 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).

137. Rex, 660 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1981).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
139. 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981).
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ical entity," may be held liable for the acts of the sovereign that
owns it. 40° This decision effectively held that the nonimmunity of
the corporation does not affect the immunity of the sovereign because the entities are distinct. The Second Circuit refuses, however, to recognize the distinct nature of the entities in the instant
context. By congressional fiat, a foreign sovereign and a corporation owned by the sovereign are considered the same entity under
the FSIA.14 1 Allowing the very statute under constitutional attack
to overrule a long, clear line of authority is erroneous.
Finally, each of the instant courts emphasized congressional
foreign policy objectives. 42 These objectives are entitled to substantial weight, but it is improper for these policy factors to override a fundamental constitutional right. Allowing Congress to define away a long established distinction between corporations and
their owners and thus defeat a fundamental constitutional right
is, as Judge Sloviter put it, playing "Polonius to Congress'
Hamlet."' 43
V.

CONCLUSION

The proper approach to these cases is to face the seventh
140. Id. at 920.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). For the relevant text of that statute, see supra
note 75.
142. Rex, 660 F.2d at 69; Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875,
879 (4th Cir. 1981); Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana de Vapores, 639 F.2d 872,
880 (2d Cir. 1981). The example of Santa Fe International illustrates the impropriety of this approach. Santa Fe, formerly a United States corporation, was
purchased by Kuwait in late 1981. Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Because
Kuwait owns a controlling interest in Santa Fe, the corporation is a foreign sovereign within the meaning of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2). Under the analysis used by the courts in these cases, the fact that Kuwait purchased Santa Fe is
alone sufficient to remove the plaintiff's jury trial right in a legal action. It is
difficult to comprehend the foreign policy objectives furthered by this legal
result.
143. Rex, 660 F.2d at 76 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a
HAMLET:
camel?
By th' mass and 'tis, like a camel indeed.
POLONIUS:
Methinks it is like a weasel.
HAMLET:
It is backed like a weasel.
POLONIUS:
Or like a whale.
HAMLET:
Very like a whale.
POLONIUS:
W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, act III, scene ii (Penguin ed.
1969).
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amendment issue squarely. A suit in law against a corporation
owned by a foreign sovereign is clearly an action covered by the
seventh amendment as that amendment was interpreted by
Pernell v. Southall Realty. Even if Congress can place conditions
on the right to sue a foreign sovereign, a suit against the sovereign's corporations is a different matter. Foreign sovereigns are
distinct from the corporations they own. As more governments
engage in commercial activities by forming corporations, it becomes imperative that a plaintiff suing a corporation owned by a
foreign sovereign retain his seventh amendment guarantees.
William A. Zan Blue

